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I. INTRODUCTION

Punitive damages are a civil penalty "aimed at deterrence and
retribution" that further the state's interest in punishing unlawful
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conduct.'
They are meant to "sting" and should be imposed
proportionally according to the "egregiousness of the harm and the
wealth of the transgressor."2 While compensatory damages are
intended to compensate plaintiffs for their concrete losses, punitive
damages use the plaintiff as an instrument for "visiting []punishment
upon [the] extreme tortious misdeeds" of defendants. 3 As such, it is
well settled that no individual plaintiff is entitled to punitive
damages; however, "it is equally true that no transgressor is entitled
4
to be relieved of exposure to them."
When punitive damages are sought through adjudication of
individual claims, it is feared that multiple claims brought by
individual plaintiffs will over-punish defendants while giving victims
who "race to the courtroom door" a windfall not available to later
claimants. 5 For years, courts have struggled with concerns about
duplicative punishment of defendants and the equitable distribution of
such awards among plaintiffs. With the recent influx of mass tort
cases dealing with products liability, courts can no longer ignore these
issues.
The concept of a punitive damages class has emerged as a
potential means of providing distributive justice to plaintiffs, while
still protecting defendants from multiple, successive punishments. In
this regard, some parties have sought to certify mandatory punitive
damages classes under Federal Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 6 when "litigation
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests." 7 In other words, in the
1. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
2.
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of
Punitive Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 979, 979 (200 1).

3.

Richard A. Nagareda, Punitive Damages Class Actions and the Baseline of Tort, 36

WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 949 (2001).

4.
Cabraser, supra note 2, at 982.
5.
Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Thomas M. Sobol, Equity for the Victims, Equity for the
Transgressor:The Classwide Treatment of Punitive Damages Claims, 74 TUL. L. REV. 2005, 2006
(2000).
6.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(1)(B). This class is considered "mandatory" because Rule 23(c)(2),
which gives class members the ability to opt out, does not apply to Rule 23(b)(1)(B); therefore, all
members of the class are bound by the outcome of the certified action. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
Generally, adjudication is considered to be dispositive of interests of other members not a party
to the suit when there is a limited fund available to cover all the claims. Cabraser & Sobol,
supra note 5, at 2008.
7.
Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 5, at 2008. The argument for certification based on a
limited fund theory is two-fold: one, the constitutional limit on punitive damages will cap the
amount defendants can be forced to pay, and two, early plaintiffs who receive a windfall may
prevent later plaintiffs from receiving anything at all.
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punitive damages context, a mandatory class may be utilized where
''multiple punitive damage claims for the same conduct threaten to
deplete the defendant's assets 0 as to foreclose or diminish later
claims for both punitive and compensatory damages, [or] where
multiple punitive damages claims... may exhaust the substantive
legal limits that the Supreme Court has set as permissible
punishment."8 This Note will focus on the latter of these claims.
The traditional application of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and current
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the rule may weigh against the
certification of mandatory punitive damages classes. In Ortiz v.
Fibreboard,9 the United States Supreme Court extensively explored
the application of mandatory classes based on a limited fund under
Federal Rule 23(b)(1)(B). In particular, the Court focuses on limited
fund class actions, laying down the necessary requirements for class
certification on a limited fund rationale.1 0 The Court held that there
must be evidence that the fund is limited, that the "whole of the
inadequate fund be devoted to the overwhelming claims," and the
claimants be identified by a "common theory of recovery [and] treated
equitably among themselves."1 1
The Ortiz Court seemed concerned about a departure from the
historical limited fund model, perhaps anticipating an increased
likelihood of abuse in using mandatory limited funds at times when
the fund is not sufficiently limited. 12 As a result, Ortiz seems to
restrict certification under a mandatory limited fund rationale to a
small number of cases. Ortiz failed to answer an important question,
however: how should courts deal with mass tort litigation involving
punitive damages where the limited fund is created not in the
traditional way-by the defendant's inadequate assets-but instead is
limited by a constitutional cap on liability? This question has become
increasingly salient since State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, where the Court solidified the notion of a constitutional due
process limit on punitive damages. 13
While other commentators have considered the viability of
mandatory punitive classes under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), none have focused
on certification in light of the Court's decisions in both Ortiz and State
Farm. This Note will focus on how the Court's account of the
8.
Id. at 2012-13.
9.
527 U.S. 815 (1999).
10. Id. at 838-41.
!1. Id.
12. Id. at 842. The Court, looking to the Advisory Committee and the Rules Enabling
Clause, stated that the goal of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is to stay close to the historical model. Id.
13. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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constitutional limit on punitive damages in State Farm fits into the
framework of the Court's previous decision in Ortiz. Specifically, this
Note will address how lower courts may reconcile the two decisions
when deciding issues of certification for mandatory punitive damages
classes, and whether the Court should rethink the limitations placed
on mandatory limited fund class actions in Ortiz, in light of the
constitutional caps on punitive damages in State Farm. Finally, this
Note will consider the practical need for innovations in the area of
mandatory punitive damages classes, looking at pragmatic arguments,
issues of equity, and societal concerns for the evolution of civil
litigation.

II. ORTIZ AND STATE FARM: THE SUPREME COURT ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

Because certification of mandatory punitive damage classes is
tightly linked to the Court's recent jurisprudence on Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
and punitive damages, a survey of these essential holdings is
necessary to the discussion that follows.
A. Ortiz v. Fibreboard
From the 1920s through 1971, Fibreboard Corporation
manufactured a number of products which contained asbestos,
4
resulting in hundreds of thousands of claims against the company.'
15
Consequently, Fibreboard found itself litigating on "two fronts."
Fibreboard dealt not only with thousands of plaintiffs' claims for
compensatory damages, which continued to grow throughout the
1980s and 1990s, but also fought battles with Continental Casualty
and Pacific Indemnity Company, who had insured Fibreboard at
16
different times under similar general liability policies.
In 1990, a California trial court found both insurance
companies responsible for the indemnification of claims brought by
plaintiffs exposed to Fibreboard asbestos products during the years
the insurance policies were in effect. 17 The insurance companies
appealed this ruling, but with the coverage case unresolved and the
14. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821-22.
15. Id. at 822.
16. Id. Continental Casualty insured Fibreboard from May 1957 through March 1959. Id.
Pacific Indemnity Company had insured it from 1956 to 1957 under a similar policy. Id. The
policy was a comprehensive general liability policy which provided limits of "$1 million per
occurrence, $500,000 per claim, and [had] no aggregate limit." Id.
17. Id. at 822-23.
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possibility of "unbounded liability," the parties began settlement
talks.1 8 Attorneys for the asbestos plaintiffs, Fibreboard, and the
insurance carriers eventually approved the terms of a "Global
Settlement Agreement."'19 The insurers conditioned the agreement "on
20
a guarantee of 'total peace,' ensuring no unknown future liabilities."
Accordingly, a settlement would require a mandatory class action that
would bind all potential plaintiffs and allow none to opt out of the
21
class.
Per the agreement, a group of plaintiffs filed for certification in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
22
seeking certification of a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
The class would consist of three groups: (1) all those with personal
injury claims for asbestos exposure who had not yet brought suit, (2)
those who had dismissed their claims but retained the right to sue,
and (3) "past, present and future spouses, parents, children and other
relatives of class members." 23 The plaintiffs justified the class
certification by pointing to a "shared necessity of ensuring insurance
24
funds sufficient for compensation" of all claimants.
The agreement provided that Fibreboard, Continental and
Pacific would create a trust to pay all plaintiffs' asbestos claims,
including personal injury and death claims, in exchange for full
release from liability to all class members.2 5 Generally, those seeking
compensation would be required to settle with the trust, funded by
26 If
$1.525 billion from the insurers and $10 million from Fibreboard.
the initial settlement attempts failed, the agreement required
claimants to participate in mediation and arbitration before they could
proceed to court. 27 Even then, the agreement limited claims to
Additionally, a
$500,000 and barred punitive damage awards.
"spendthrift provision" provided for the payment of the most serious
claims first in an effort to conserve the trust in the event of a
28
shortfall.
18. Id. at 824.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is used to certify a non-opt out class.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 825-26.
24. Id. at 827.
25. Id. at 827.
26. Id. at 825-27. While $10 million was coming from Fibreboard, in reality, only $500,000
would actually be paid by Fibreboard, with the other $9.5 million coming from other insurance
proceeds. Id. at 825.
27. Id. at 827.
28. Id.
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Following an eight-day fairness hearing, the District Court
found that the settlement agreement met the requirements under
Rule 23(a) and certified the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 29 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the certification under a "limited
fund" rationale, noting that Fibreboard's total insurance coverage,
combined with the company's net worth, would be insufficient to cover
all claims against it.30 A group of intervenors' objecting to the
certification appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine the issue of certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
31
on a limited fund rationale.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that
the class could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 32 While
conceding that the text of the rule was broad, the Court noted that if a
more limiting interpretation was not followed, then (b)(1)(B) could be
used in ways that would violate the Rules Enabling Act, 33 the Seventh
Amendment, and constitutional due process. 34 Seeking to limit such a
construction, the Court interpreted the limited fund through the
Rule's historical context and the intent of the drafters of the 1966
35
amendments.
After exploring the historical development of limited fund class
actions, the Court found three common characteristics they believed
were "presumptively necessary" to have a limited fund class action: (1)
an insufficient fund; (2) the "whole inadequate fund" must be used to
pay the claims; and (3) claimants must be treated equitably. 36 The
Court then applied these characteristics to the settlement class before
37
it, concluding that the elements were not met.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 829.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The Rules Enabling Act mandates that "rules of procedure shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
34. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 845-56. The Court believed certification of a mandatory class and
settlement of the action would implicate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial for absent
class members. Id. at 845. The mandatory class also implicates the due process principle that
one is not bound by a judgment to which he is not a party by service or process. Id. at 846.
35. Id. at 833-37. In detailing an extensive history of the limited fund class action, the
Court suggests that "classic" limited fund class actions "include claimants to trust assets, a bank
account, insurance proceeds, company assets in a liquidation sale, proceeds of a ship sale in a
maritime accident suit, and others." Id. at 834 (citing, ultra vires, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B)
advisory committee's note). Additionally, the Court cites several cases to illustrate the
traditional use of a limited fund. See, e.g., id. at 836 n.14.
36. Id. at 838-40.
37. Id.
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The class failed the first element because the fund was not
sufficiently limited. 38 To obtain (b)(1)(B) certification, the Court held,
parties must present evidence that enables a court to "ascertain the
limit and insufficiency of the fund, with support in findings of fact." 39
Here, there was no evidence that the fund was limited outside the
40
parties' own agreement.
Next, the Court held that the settlement failed the
characteristic requiring exhaustion of the limited fund. 4' Under the
settlement agreement at issue, Fibreboard was able to retain all but
$500,000 of its net worth. 42 In this regard, the arrangement did not
appear to be "the best that can be provided for class members." 43
Finally, the Court ruled that the requirement of equity among
class members raises two separate issues: "the inclusiveness of the
class and the fairness of distributions to those within it."44 Here, the

settlement class failed the inclusiveness prong because it excluded as
much as a third of potential claimants who might at some point have
cognizable claims, a number of whom were represented by class
counsel. 45 The Court left open the question of whether this exclusion
could be excused if all claimants ended up with comparable benefits
but concluded that the settled inventory claims obtained better terms
46
than class members.
Regarding the fairness of distributions, the Court again found
the settlement certification lacking. 47 Here, the class had an inherent
conflict of interest between those who wanted immediate payment and
those with potential future injuries. 48 Additionally, the class consisted
of claimants exposed both before and after 1959, the year the
insurance policies expired. 49
This distinction created another
disparity of interests because claimants injured prior to the expiration
of the insurance coverage had more valuable claims.50 This conflict
required the division of the class into "homogeneous subclasses under

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 848.
at 848-49.
859-60.
at 859.
at 859-60.
at 854.
at 855.
at 855-58.
at 857.
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Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with separate representation to eliminate conflicting
interests of counsel."5 1
In addition to finding that the proposed settlement agreement
did not meet the listed requirements, the Court questioned whether
the limited fund class action could ever to be used to handle mass tort
claims.5 2 The Court noted that the Advisory Committee did not intend
the mandatory class action be used to "aggregate unliquidated tort
claims." 53 Moreover, the limited fund did not fit the situation where
the claims "might eventually result in a judgment that in the
54
aggregate could exceed the assets available to satisfy them."
The Ortiz Court purposely adopted a conservative view of
23(b)(1)(B): constraining its interpretation to the rule's historical
roots. The question that remains is how these constraints affect the
ability of lower courts to use mandatory certification to deal with
issues such as mandatory punitive damage classes in the context of
mass product liability suits. To better answer this question, the next
Section turns to the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm, which
emphasized the need for mandatory punitive damage classes by
capping the constitutional limit for punitive damage awards against
defendants.
B. State Farm v. Campbell
In recent years, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
several cases in an effort to clarify the substantive and procedural due
process requirements applicable when imposing punitive damage
awards. The most recent case discussing punitive damages is State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.55 In State Farm,
the Supreme Court reversed a $145 million dollar punitive damage
award after concluding the amount of the award violated the due
56
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1981, Campbell attempted to pass the traffic ahead of him
while driving on a two-lane highway. 57 Another driver, Ospital, was
approaching from the opposite direction and had to swerve to avoid
51. Id. at 856 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997) (noting class
settlements must provide "structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the
diverse groups and individuals affected").
52. Id. at 843.
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. Id. (quoting William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of
Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837, 840 (1995)) (emphasis added).
55. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
56. Id. at 412.
57. Id.
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hitting Campbell.58 Ospital lost control of the vehicle and crashed into
a third driver, Slusher. 59 Ospital was killed, Slusher was permanently
60
disabled, and the Campbells were unharmed.
Slusher and Ospital's estate sued Campbell. 6 1 State Farm,
Campbell's insurer, contested liability and declined to settle the
claims for the policy limit of $50,000.62 Even with a consensus among
witnesses and investigators that Campbell caused the crash, State
Farm took the case to trial, assuring the Campbells that "their assets
were safe, that they had no liability for the accident, that [State Farm]
would represent their interests, and that they did not need to procure
separate counsel." 63 The jury returned a verdict against Campbell for
$185,849 and State Farm refused to cover the amount in excess of the
policy limit, the same amount proposed in the settlement. 64 Ospital
and Slusher then agreed not to seek judgment from Campbell, if
65
Campbell agreed to pursue a bad faith claim against State Farm.
At the bad faith trial, Campbell's counsel "convinced the trial
court that there was no limitation on the scope of evidence that could
be considered," presenting evidence of State Farm's operational
deficiencies from across the country. 66 The jury awarded Campbell
$2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive
damages. 67 The trial court reduced the verdict to $1 million for
compensatory and $25 million for punitive damages. 6
The Utah
Supreme Court later reinstated the jury award, precipitating State
69
Farm's appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reversed the Utah Supreme Court's
reinstatement of the $145 million punitive damage award and
delivered a broad analysis of the purpose and scope of punitive
damages. 70 Warning that punitive damages can violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if they are "grossly
excessive or arbitrary," the Court reiterated and expanded upon the
58. Id. at 412-13.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 413.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64.

Id.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 420. Through testimony of State Farm employees and experts, Campbell
introduced evidence attempting to show that the original case was taken to trial as part of a
national effort to meet "corporate fiscal goals by capping payouts on claims company wide." Id.
67. Id. at 415.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 416-18.
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"three guideposts" presented in Gore v. BMW, which were used to
71
determine whether an award of punitive damages was excessive.
The Court held that of the three guideposts, the first, the
"degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct," is the most
important element for determining the reasonableness of a punitive
damage award.7 2 The Court set out several factors courts can consider
to determine reprehensibility. These factors include: whether the
harm to the plaintiff(s) was physical or economic; if the defendant
acted with "reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;" the
financial vulnerability of the victim; whether the conduct was the
result of repeated actions of the defendant or an isolated incident; and
finally, whether the harm resulted from "intentional malice, trickery,
or deceit, or mere accident." 73
Applying these factors, the Court noted that while State Farm's
actions "merit[ed] no praise," the award of punitive damages of this
size was unwarranted.7 4 Because Campbell had attempted to show
that State Farm's practices "transcend[ed]" his case by introducing
evidence of nationwide misconduct, 75 the Court was concerned that
State Farm was being punished for its operations across the country
and not for its conduct in the Campbell case alone.7 6 The Court stated
that "[a] State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have
been lawful where it occurred," nor does a state have an interest in
imposing punitive damages for conduct that occurs outside its
borders.7 7 Accordingly, the Court found the punitive damage award
bore no relation to the direct harm to Campbell, but was based on
State Farm's nationwide conduct and, therefore, failed the
78
reprehensibility prong.
The Court's second guidepost considers the ratio between the
actual damages and the punitive damage award. 79 As in Gore, the
Court declined to set a "concrete constitutional limit" on the ratio;
however, the Court stated that "few awards exceeding a single-digit
71. Id. at 416.
72. Id. at 419.
73. Id. The Court also noted that "[t]he existence of any one of these factors weighing in
favor of the plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence
of all of them renders any award suspect." Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 420.
76. Id. at 421. The Court found that the Utah courts improperly relied on evidence of the
defendant's "dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised," and
held due process required the defendant only be punished for acts that harmed the plaintiff, not
other parties who may have hypothetical claims. Id. at 422.
77. Id. at 421.
78. Id. at 424. The Court also found no evidence of repeated conduct. Id. at 423-24.
79. Id. at 424.
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ratio between punitive and compensatory damages ... will satisfy due
process."8 0 Accordingly, the Court held there is a "presumption
against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio," especially when the harm
is economic and not physical.8 1 The Court found that Campbell's
argument that State Farm will only be punished in rare cases, mixed
with references to the company's assets unrelated to his actual harm,
8 2
did not justify the "unconstitutional punitive damages award."
Finally, the third guidepost as outlined in Gore examines the
"disparity between the punitive damages award and 'the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.' "83 In State
Farm, the Court found a huge disparity between the $145 million
84
award of punitive damages and the civil penalty of $10,000 for fraud.
The State Farm decision clarifies that there is a constitutional
limit on the amount of punitive damages that can be rendered against
a particular defendant.8 5 This limit creates a potential problem: it
leaves open the possibility that early punitive damage claims may
exhaust the substantive legal limits of permissible punishment,
86
preventing subsequent plaintiffs from recovering punitive damages.
This conflict raises the question of whether a mandatory punitive
damage class can be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on a "limited
punishment" or limited fund theory, given the procedural strictures in
Ortiz that limit certification under the Rule to its historical context.
III. THE FEASIBILITY OF MANDATORY PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLASSES
UNDER ORTIZ AND STATE FARM

The question of certification for mandatory punitive damage
classes under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) would be less difficult if Ortiz were the

80. Id. at 424-25. The Court pointed out that, in its BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996), decision, it had "referenced a long legislative history . . . providing for
sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish." Id. If a particularly
egregious harm results in only minimal compensatory damages, however, the punitive damages
award may exceed these historical markers.
81. Id. at 426.
82. Id. at 427.
83. Id. at 428.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 429 (discussing the guideposts which limit punitive damages awards).
86. Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 5, at 2008; Joan Steinman, Managing Punitive Damages:
A Role for Mandatory Limited Generosity" Classes and Anti-Suit Injunctions?, 36 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1043, 1062-65 (2001). An additional argument for certifying punitive damages classes is
the need to protect compensatory funds for later claimants. Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 5, at
2012. Because the issue of compensatory funds does not involve the constitutional caps on
punitive damages under State Farm,it is beyond the scope of this Note.
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only precedent.8 7 In other words, with no constitutional rule of law
limiting the amount of punitive damages that could be rendered
against a defendant, arguing for certification based on a limited
generosity theory8 8 would be difficult. Prior to State Farm, only a
handful of mandatory punitive damage classes had been certified
under 23(b)(1)(B), 8 9 with the vast majority of such attempts perishing
on appeal. 90 These early efforts at limited generosity certification
began in the 1980s and cited concerns over the fair distribution of
punitive damage awards to plaintiffs and the protection of defendants
from multiple excessive punitive damage liability. 91
For example, in "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability
Litigation and In re School Asbestos Litigation, two district courts
certified punitive damage classes on a limited generosity theory. Both
courts noted that at some point state or constitutional limits would
prohibit further punitive damages from being awarded against the
defendant for a single course of conduct, creating a limited fund based
on legal limits that would prevent excessive and repetitive awards of
punitive damages. 92 The appellate courts in both cases, while noting a

87. With no legal or constitutional limit on the amount of punitive damages that could be
rendered against a defendant, it would be more difficult to analogize to a limited fund under a
limited punishment theory. Courts, therefore, would be guided only by the restricted application
of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in Ortiz.
88. Certification under a limited generosity theory is a variant of the insufficient asset
notion, describing situations where there is a "legal limit on liability" rather than a limit on the
defendant's capacity to pay. Steinman, supra note 86, at 1047. This limit creates a "ceiling on
recovery" that proponents argue justifies certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), since early
adjudication by plaintiffs will restrict the ability of later claimants to recover against the
defendant. Id.
89. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 705-13 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (certifying plaintiffs, who brought suit against defendant chemical manufacturers, under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B), based on claims of serious medical problems resulting from exposure to "Agent
Orange" during the Vietnam War). In certifying the class, Judge Weinstein found that federal
substantive law applied and would govern punitive damages because the federal government had
an overwhelming interest in the exposure that occurred during the Vietnam War. Id. at 705.
The Second Circuit refused to grant mandamus to vacate certification under 23(b)(1)(B). In re
Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co.. v. Ryan, 725 F.2d 858, 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067
(1984). Its opinion suggested agreement with Judge Weinstein that the high probability of future
plaintiffs being unable to recover punitive damages justified mandatory certification. Steinman,
supra note 86, at 1066-67.
90. See infra note 91.
91. Laura J. Hines, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.: Lessons in State Class Actions,
Punitive Damages, and Jury Decision-Making: Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages in
Class Actions, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889, 902 (2001).
92. In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (certifying a punitive damages class under 23(b)(1)(B) on a limited punishment
theory); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (certifying a punitive
damages class under 23(b)(1)(B) finding a likelihood that multiple punitive damages judgments
against a defendant will eventually lead to "overkill") (citations omitted); Hines, supra note 91,
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concern
for excessive punishment,
nevertheless
overturned
certification on the basis that no rule of law existed limiting the
amount of punitive damages that may be awarded against
93
defendants.
It is possible that the Court's decision in State Farm, had it
been in effect at the time of the appeals, would have mandated
different outcomes in the foregoing cases. It is important to note,
however, that these cases were also certified by the district courts
prior to the decision in Ortiz, which seems to limit Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
certification to its historical context.
The landscape of mass tort litigation has changed, bringing
with it an influx of confusion. Not long after Ortiz, which seemingly
sounded the death knell for mandatory certification of punitive
damage classes under 23(b)(1)(B), 94 State Farm again enlivened the
debate over the certification of punitive damage classes based on a
limited generosity theory. This Note will now focus on how State
Farm has reopened the door for proponents of mandatory punitive
damage class certification to argue the need for such certification
under 23(b)(1)(B).
A. State Farm's Effect on Mandatory Punitive Damage Classes
While the Ortiz opinion strictly limits the certification of
mandatory classes under 23(b)(1)(B) to its historical roots, State Farm
may call that practice into question. The arguments for certifying
mandatory punitive damage classes extend beyond the limited
generosity theory, which analogizes the constitutional limit on the
amount of punitive damages to a traditional limited fund. State Farm
has led some commentators to argue additional reasons for the
certification of mandatory punitive damage classes in mass torts
95
cases.
at 902-06 (noting the history of cases starting in the 1980s that attempted certification on a
limited generosity theory).
93. In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir.
1982); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 1986).
94. Leading Cases: II. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 113 HARV. L. REV. 306, 311
(1999).
95. See e.g. Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Michael G. Nast, A Plaintiffs Perspective on the Effect
of State Farm v. Campbell on Punitive Damages in Mass Torts, 3 Litig. Rep.: Class Actions
(Mealey's) (June 19, 2003). (arguing the Supreme Court's holding in State Farm supports the role
of class actions in mass tort litigation). For the purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the
propositions of these commentators suggest a plausible reading of the State Farm opinion and its
potential effects on mass tort litigation; however, the essential premise that State Farm allows
certification of punitive damage classes in all cases, based on the limited generosity theory, will
be questioned infra, Part II.C.2.
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In State Farm, the Court found that the punitive damage
award was improperly determined by taking into account evidence of
the out-of-state conduct of State Farm in unrelated cases. 96 The Court
held that out-of-state conduct is only admissible when the conduct
97
"has a specific nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff."
Accordingly, State Farm's holding suggests class certification to meet
the due process requirements for punitive damages. 98
In most mass tort cases involving the mass marketing of
products, almost all bad conduct takes place in a state other than the
plaintiffs. 99 For example, a product may be made in one state, tested
in another, and marketed in a number of different states. 10 0 In the
mass tort context, the out-of-state conduct is often admissible for
rendering punitive damages because it "satisfies the critical
requirement of the 'nexus to the specific harm suffered by the
plaintiff.' "101
As such, certification of punitive damage classes
comports with the Supreme Court's requirement that defendants only
be punished for conduct directed toward parties before the court.102
Additionally, in cases where there is no class action, parties
who are not before the court are not bound by the judgment of earlier
plaintiffs; therefore, nonparties are free to seek their own punitive
damage awards against defendants, potentially leading to multiple
punitive damage awards for the same conduct. 10 3 The certification of a
punitive damage class alleviates the concern over multiple punitive
damage awards for similar conduct, since as a non-opt out class, all
parties' claims are bound by the judgment. 104 It seems, therefore, that
mandatory certification of punitive damage classes comports with the
requirements of State Farm, while avoiding both windfalls to early
plaintiffs and over-punishment for similar conduct by defendants. 105
The question of certification of mandatory punitive damage
classes under 23(b)(1)(B) has assumed considerable practical
significance with the Simon II tobacco litigation, which is among the
first mandatory punitive damage classes to attempt certification after

96. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003).
97. Id.; Cabraser & Nast, supra note 95, at 5.
98. State Farm, 123 U.S. at 1522; Cabraser & Nast, supra note 95, at 5 (arguing that the
Court's decision in State Farm would permit certification of punitive damages in mass torts).
99. Cabraser & Nast, supra note 95, at 5.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Ortiz and State Farm.10 6 In Simon II, U.S. District Judge Jack
Weinstein certified a limited fund class action for punitive damages
against the tobacco industry. 10 7 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
recently vacated the class certification;10 8 however, Simon II provides
a working example of how courts are applying Ortiz and State Farm to
mandatory punitive damage classes under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
The Simon 11 plaintiffs sued the tobacco industry, alleging
fraudulent conduct toward consumers and seeking class certification
for a mandatory punitive damage class. 10 9 This certification request
was based on Rule 23(b)(1)(B) under a "limited punishment" theory. 110
While Judge Weinstein granted certification of the punitive damage
class on a limited fund/limited generosity theory, it was not without
Before establishing certification under
extensive consideration.
(b)(1)(B), the court considered a number of substantive, procedural,
and factual issues."' First, since plaintiffs from all fifty states alleged
injuries, the court dealt with conflicts of law that would affect a nonopt out punitive damage national class. 1 2 Second, the court addressed3
how it would handle proof of causation and damages calculations.1
Finally, the court considered whether the non-opt out punitive damage
114
class met the requirements of certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
Judge Weinstein ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs and
certified the class, noting "[b]ecause punitive damages will be capped,
plaintiffs are forced to draw any damages from a limited fund of
resources."1 15 This situation creates a "first-in-time" problem, where
early plaintiffs will recover windfalls from punitive damage verdicts
while later plaintiffs are left with a depleted fund from which they
11 6
cannot recover.
106. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y 2002).
107. Id. at 96.
108. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the premise that the constitutional due
process limitation on the amount of punitive damages that may be assessed against a defendant
created a limited fund. The court held the constitutional cap on punitive damages is "a
theoretical one, unlike any of those in the cases cited in Ortiz... and for that reason it is not easily
susceptible to proof, definition, or even estimation, by any precise figure." The court also noted
that the certification order likely failed the requirements in State Farm by allowing class
certification for the determination of punitive damages prior to any assessment of compensatory
damages. See infra Part III C (2).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 190.
111. Id. at 107.
112. Id. at 165-74.
113. Id. at 146-59.
114. Id. at 183-86, 190.
115. Id. at 190.
116. Id.
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While the question of certification of punitive damage classes
can arise in a number of mass tort contexts outside tobacco litigation,
Simon 11 provides a useful lens to view whether such certification
should be granted in light of Ortiz's procedural restrictions on
certification and State Farm's constitutional limits on punitive
damages. The next section of this Note will consider whether the
Simon 1I class certification should survive its appeal and how lower
courts should consider similar cases, in light of State Farm and Ortiz.
B. Ortiz's Relevance to Certificationof Limited Generosity Classes
Before courts determine whether certification of mandatory
limited generosity funds can be reconciled with the Ortiz opinion, they
must first determine whether Ortiz should apply at all. Because Ortiz
dealt with the traditional application of limited funds and not a
limited generosity class, the answer to this question is debatable. Not
surprisingly, those seeking certification of limited generosity funds
suggest Ortiz has limited applicability to the question of
certification, 117 while opponents of certification contend it prevents
118
certification of these classes entirely.
Because the Ortiz Court restricted its discussion to traditional
limited funds, some commentators argue that the Court intentionally
left open the possibility of other types of mass tort certification,
including certification of punitive damage classes. 11 9 Under this
theory of "decisional minimalism," it is arguable that the Justices
were making a "deliberate decision[] about what should be left
unsaid," namely the possibility of mass tort certification in future
cases. 20 This argument is strengthened by the Ortiz opinion itself,
where the majority stated at three different points in the opinion that
they were not deciding whether Rule 23(b)(1)(B) enabled class
certification of mass tort claims. 121
While limiting Ortiz's application only to traditional limited
funds would certainly ease lower courts' concerns about granting
117. See Steinman, supra note 86, at 1075 ("Neither Ortiz, nor Amchem, nor any other
Supreme Court decision disallowed, or even addressed, mandatory punitive damages classes
certified under Ruler 23(b)(1)(B)."). For example, the plaintiffs seeking certification in Simon H
argued that Ortiz did not apply, and Judge Weinstein seemed to agree. Simon II, 211 F.R.D. at
13. Judge Weinstein noted, "the instant case is quite different from Ortiz and its progeny." Id.
The basic argument is that, because Ortiz did not address the issue of mandatory punitive
damage classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the decision is inapplicable outside the
traditional limited fund context. Id.
118. Nagareda, supranote 3, at 949.
119. Leading Cases, supra note 94, at 311.
120. Id. at 311-12.
121. Id.; Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 844, 860 n.34, 864 (1999).
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certification of punitive damage classes under 23(b)(1)(B), doing so is
contrary to the Court's mandate in Ortiz. The Ortiz Court conceded
that the text of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) was broad enough to incorporate
additional classes for certification; nevertheless, the Court held that in
granting certification courts should stick to the Rule's "historical"
context, explicitly rejecting an "adventurous application" of the
Rule. 122
It is hard to imagine that certifying mandatory punitive
damage classes under 23(b)(1)(B) would not be considered
"adventurous" by the Ortiz Court. In fact, the Ortiz majority found it
simply implausible that the Advisory Committee, so concerned about the potential
difficulties posed by mass tort cases under Ruler 23(b)(3), with its provision for notice
and the right to opt out ...would have uncritically assumed that mandatory versions 23
of
such class actions, lacking such protectionD, could be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 1

One commentator advises that Ortiz reaffirmed the "protections that
must accompany the coercive potential that is endemic to aggregate
litigation techniques ... [to] safeguard against the risk of collusion
' 124
and outright betrayal of the interests of absent class members.
While Ortiz did not directly address the question of punitive
damage classes under 23(b)(1)(B), the Court's language impliedly
disallows a departure from the rule's traditional application.
Accordingly, the Ortiz procedural restrictions are better understood as
applying to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) generally, rather than being restricted to
the context of the traditional limited fund. Accordingly, any attempts
to certify punitive damage classes should meet the "presumptive"
requirements for limited funds as explained in Ortiz,125 with no
exceptions for more adventurous applications of the Rule that were
left unexplored in the opinion. Application of Ortiz would require
mandatory punitive damage classes to: (1) demonstrate the existence
of a limited fund; (2) ensure inclusion of all claimants; and (3) have
equitable distribution among all claimants. 126 This Note will now
explore whether mandatory punitive damage classes can fulfill these
requirements.

122. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 843, 845.
123. Id. at 844.
124. Samuel Issacharoff, "Shocked" Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (2002) (applauding the safeguards the Court
established in Ortiz to protect the interests of absent class members).
125. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 841-42.
126. Id.
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C. Obstacles to Mandatory Punitive Damage Classes Posed by Ortiz
. and State Farm
The procedural limitations set forth in Ortiz may serve as a
barrier to many mandatory punitive damage classes seeking
certification on a limited generosity theory; however, State Farm's due
process limitation on punitive damages suggests an emerging need for
such classes as a procedural mechanism. Thus, outright rejection of
certification is difficult. The answer will require an evaluation of each
individual punitive damage class to determine whether it meets the
standards set out in Ortiz.
Several issues arise when considering whether such classes are
permitted under the procedural requirements of Ortiz. A primary
concern is whether there is a definitely ascertainable amount that
exceeds the limit that can be awarded for punitive damages against a
defendant for the same source of conduct. In considering the existence
of a definitely ascertainable limit for mandatory punitive damage
classes, one must consider: (1) whether a constitutional due process
limit creates a definitely ascertainable limit or one that is merely
theoretically limited; and (2) whether the fund will be exceeded by the
aggregate claims of the plaintiffs.
1. The Nature of a Due Process Limitation on Punitive Damages
The arguments in favor of certification for punitive damage
classes under 23(b)(1)(B) stem from an analogy of these classes to
traditional limited funds. 127 Proponents of certification contend that
the constitutional due process limit on the amount of punitive
damages creates a pool of potential funds that is limited by law, in the
same way that the net worth of a defendant corporation imposes a
128
limit on its ability to pay damages in a traditional limited fund.
Accordingly, because juries would be permitted to reduce damage
awards for later plaintiffs in light of prior awards, "there is a
substantial probability that 'adjudication with respect to individual
members of the class... would as a practical matter be dispositive of
the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication.' "129
Limited generosity funds, however, are fundamentally different
than the traditional limited funds contemplated in Ortiz. In Ortiz, the
127. Nagareda, supranote 3, at 956-57.
128. Id.; see also Steinman, supra note 86, at 1063-65 (noting that subsequent plaintiffs
would be unable to collect damages); Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 5, at 2005 (noting that the
limited pool of damages money posed the danger of a race to file).
129. Id. at 2013; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
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Court required evidence with support in findings of fact that the fund
was actually limited, and not simply limited by virtue of the parties'
own agreement. 130 In view of that requirement, the certification on a
limited fund concept should survive only "for funds that truly would be
limited in the context of actual litigation, absent the existence of the
class action."131 In other words, because the constitutional limit on
punitive damages cannot be determined prior to certification of the
class, one commentator suggests that it is "limited only in some
theoretical sense that can be given practical bite only upon
132
certification of the class."
The limited nature of the punitive damage fund is only
theoretically limited because of the decentralized structure of the tort
system itself.1 33 With no centralized government control requiring
suits to be brought against defendants, efforts to enforce the
constitutional limit outside certification are nonexistent.134
The
limited fund created by the constitutional cap is only a possible or
hypothetical limit, which fails to meet Ortiz's mandate that there be
evidence, based in fact, of the limited fund. This argument is
supported by the fact that no plaintiff has ever been denied punitive
damages based on the defendant reaching its purported constitutional
1 35
limit in previously litigated cases.
Because the constitutional limit for punitive damages is
unlikely to be attained without class certification, certifying the class
under 23(b)(1)(B) violates a central premise in Ortiz: that the fund be
limited "independent[] of the agreement of the parties to the action."1 36
Even assuming that the constitutional limit on punitive damages
could be determined prior to certification, other roadblocks still exist,
specifically whether it can be determined if the aggregate claims of the
plaintiffs will exceed the fund.

130. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 843, 848 (1999).
131. Nagareda, supra note 3, at 957.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 958.
134. Id. at 950, 958.
135. Id. at 958.
136. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999); see also In re N. Dist of Cal. Dalkon
Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 849-50 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting certification of a
mandatory punitive damages class because the parties failed to prove the fund was limited);
Nagareda, supra note 3, at 957 (noting that Ortiz demands proof of the limited fund).
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Determining Whether Plaintiffs' Claims Exceed the Constitutional
Limit

To grant certification, a court must determine that the
aggregated claims exceed the amount of the limited fund.
Accordingly, plaintiffs seeking certification must demonstrate that
their aggregated claims for punitive damages will exceed the
137
maximum amount permitted under the Due Process Clause.
Potential problems arise under both State Farm and Ortiz in
certifying such funds on a limited generosity theory.
In Ortiz, the Court noted that the "Advisory Committee did not
contemplate that mandatory class actions under 23(b)(1)(B) would be
used to aggregate unliquidated tort claims on a limited fund
rationale."'138 When certifying mandatory punitive damage classes,
however, the tort claims often will be unliquidated at the time of
certification. For example, in Simon II, certification of the mandatory
punitive damage class, which would determine punitive damages
class-wide, occurred prior to the determination of compensatory
damages for class members. 139 This certification occurred earlier
because it is considered impractical to hold off on a class-wide
determination of punitive damages until all mass tort claims for
compensatory damages have been liquidated, a task that could take
140
decades.
Deciding punitive damages prior to compensatory damages in
this manner might be putting "the cart before the horse" in light of the
Court's holding in State Farm. 41 There, as noted supra, the Court
reiterated a key guidepost used to review awards of punitive damages,
stating that "courts must ensure that the measure of punishment is
both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm.' 4 2
Additionally, the Court held that while no bright-line existed, few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages would satisfy the requirements of due
process.1 43 A court, therefore, cannot evaluate a punitive damage
award for proportionality without first determining compensatory
harm.
137. Steinman, supra note 86, at 1080.
138. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 843.
139. In re Simon II Litig., No. 00-CV-5332, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25632, at *25 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 22, 2003).
140. Steinman, supra note 86, at 1080.
141. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Tobacco Wars: Peace in Our Time?, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 2000, at
1.
142. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003).
143. Id.
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Despite State Farm's anchoring of punitive damages to the
compensatory harm, some proponents of certification suggest the
Court's prior holding in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp. negates the notion that a determination of compensatory
damages must precede a finding of punitive damages. 144 In TXO, the
Supreme Court upheld a $10 million punitive damage award where
the compensatory harm was only $19,000.145 The Court held that it
was "appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that
the defendant's conduct would have caused to its intended victim if
the wrongful plan succeeded, as well as the possible harm to other
victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not
deterred." 146 TXO suggests that punitive damages need not be closely
linked with compensatory harm.147
The TXO Court linked the actual harm with a contemplation of
potential harm in determining that the punitive damage award was
not excessive. 148 The Court considered the potential harm to others
149
only to the extent that it could have, but had not yet, occurred.
While the Court considered potential harm, it should be noted that the
compensatory harm was still decided prior to any determination of
punitive damages. Further, "just because a class jury does not yet
know the total amount of actual harm suffered by class members does
not make such harm 'potential' for purposes of determining class
punitive damages."'150 As such, the jury will only know the extent of
harm caused, and should only consider any potential harm that could
have been caused, once class members have proven their
compensatory damages.' 51 Therefore, State Farm could be read as a
reiteration that punitive damages should only be determined after a
finding of compensatory harm.
Such an interpretation of State Farm prevents the certification
of punitive damage classes in the majority of mass tort cases,
including Simon II; however, it would not preclude all classes from
certification, because those classes that determined compensatory
damages prior to a calculation of class-wide punitive damages would

144. Coffee, supranote 141141, at 3.
145. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
146. Id. at 460.
147. Coffee, supra note 141, at 3.
148. TXO Prod. Corp. 509 U.S. at 460 (noting it was appropriate to consider the "potential
harm that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its intended victims... as well as, the
possible harm to other victims").
149. Hines, supra note 91, at 941-42.
150. Id. at 942.
151. Id.
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meet the State Farm proportionality review. 152 Although such an
approach would be more time consuming, it would achieve the most
accurate measure of punitive damages and would comply with the
requirements of State Farm and its progeny.
Even if compensatory claims are determined before the
consideration of punitive damages, other obstacles remain to
ascertaining a definite limit on a fund, so as to justify the certification
of a mandatory punitive damage class under (b)(1)(B). One such
concern stems from choice of law issues.
3. Choice of Law
Choice of law issues arise when a dispute involves the interest
of more than one state and the application of each state's law would be
"consistent with the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses of
the Constitution." 153 To establish an ascertainable limit on the "fund,"
choice of law principles would require the selection of a single state's
punitive damage law to govern the class; however, the selection of a
single state's law to govern a nationwide class action for punitive
damages raises constitutional concerns. 154 In PhillipsPetroleum Co. v.
Shutts, the Supreme Court affirmed the jurisdiction of Kansas courts
over a class action involving all fifty states and the District of
Columbia; however, it reversed the application of Kansas law to all
the transactions because Kansas did not have significant contact with
each of the class members. 155 For a particular state's law to apply in a
multi-state action, the Court held that the state "must have a
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
156
fundamentally unfair."
In certifying the tobacco plaintiffs for a mandatory punitive
damage class in Simon II, Judge Weinstein determined that choice of
152. Id. at 938-40 (suggesting that Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Baker (In re The Exxon Valdez),
229 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2000), provides a good example of a mandatory punitive damages
class that meets the requirements of proportionality for punitive damages awards because the
jury determined class-wide punitive damages after determining the amount of compensatory
harm); see also Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1217 (6th Cir. 1988) (allowing
class-wide determination of punitive damages when compensatory claims were tried first).
153. In re Simon II Litig., No. 00-CV-5332, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25632, at *228 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 22, 2002).
154. See Steinman supra note 86, at 1075-77 (noting "if no such single body of punitive
damages law will govern the punitive damages to be awarded for mass tort course of conduct,
mandatory class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) might be 'dead in the water' 'right off the
bat' ").

155. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985).
156. Id. at 818-22.
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law rules would permit the application of a single state's law to the
claims of the nationwide class. 157 He noted that the choice of New
York law met the requirements of Shutts because much of the
defendants' conduct occurred in New York: the defendants were
incorporated in New York, substantial sales occurred in New York,
158
and the industry's major investors were based there.
While proponents of certification argue that State Farm
suggests the need for nationwide punitive damage
class
certification, 159 the holding may instead mandate the opposite. In
State Farm, the Court held:
[A State does not] have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a
defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State's jurisdiction. Any proper
adjudication of conduct that occurred outside Utah to other persons would require their
inclusion, and, to those parties, the Utah courts, in the usual case, would need to apply
16 0
the laws of their relevant jurisdiction.

From this language, it can be argued that each state must apply its
own substantive law to plaintiffs' claims that lack sufficient contacts
to the proposed forum state.
Notably, State Farm holds that "a State cannot punish a
1
defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred."''
There is a vast variation among states' punitive damage laws, a
variation that even alters the standards of conduct giving rise to
punitive damage liability. 62 Accordingly, a defendant theoretically
could engage in grossly negligent conduct that would create punitive
damage liability in one state, but not in another state where punitive
damages require conduct that is willfully wanton. 63 In this regard,
the defendant's conduct may be unlawful in terms of compensatory
damages in all states, but not in terms of punitive damage liability.
This difference in state laws suggests that claims should not be
aggregated for nationwide class determination on issues of punitive
damages.
Finally, a strict reading of Shutts suggests that mandatory
certification of a nationwide punitive damage class under 23(b)(1)(B)
157. Simon II, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25632 at *228-63.
158. Id. at 261-62.
159. See supraPart II.
160. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421-22 (2003).
161. Id.
162. Hines, supra note 91, at 916-18 (noting "just as differing factual bases for punitive
liability may prevent a finding of commonality or predominance, commonality also may be
undermined to the extent that class claims arise under state laws containing different legal
standards for determining liability for punitive damages.").
163. See Steinman, supra note 86, at app. A at 1111-27 (exploring different state punitive
damages laws in terms of substantive limitations and procedural requirements for the imposition
of punitive damages).
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may now be an impossibility. Shutts involved a state class action for
overdue royalty payments from gas leases in various states. 164 After
losing at trial, the defendants appealed, claiming that the state court
lacked jurisdiction over out-of-state plaintiffs. 165 The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's jurisdiction but noted that, before
extinguishing an absent class member's claim, that plaintiff must
"receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the
litigation" and "at a minimum ... an absent plaintiff [must] be
166
provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class."
The Court articulated similar concerns in Ortiz, as noted supra,
rejecting the nationwide settlement action as an overly adventurous
application of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and expressing unease about the due
process implications of exercising jurisdiction over absent class
members in a mandatory class action. 167 In doing so, the Court
distinguished Shutts on the basis that out-of-state class members in
Shutts were given an opportunity to remove themselves from the
168
class.
The ability to certify mandatory punitive damage classes
depends on one's view of Shutts and mandatory classes.
Some
commentators suggest that Shutts is a case about "distant forum
abuse." 16 9 Under this theory, Shutts does not eliminate all mandatory
classes. 170 Instead, it prevents only those classes that are brought in
inappropriate forums. 171 To determine if a mandatory action is
maintainable, therefore, one must consider whether there are
172
sufficient contacts between the plaintiffs and the forum jurisdiction.
If there are not sufficient contacts, then under Shutts, the plaintiff
must have the ability to opt out of the class, making the class nonmandatory. 173
For example, a distant forum abuse analysis would not support
certification of mandatory punitive damages classes in nationwide
products liability cases. 174 Yet the distant forum analysis may lead to
successful certification of mandatory punitive damage classes for
164. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 802.
167. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999); Hines, supranote 91, at 909-10.
168. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 847-48; Hines, supranote 91, at 910.
169. Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class
Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L. J. 1, 52 (1986).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 53.
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plaintiffs wishing to certify claims that arise out of actions occurring
in the same jurisdiction. These cases often fall into the "mass
accident" category and liability concerns focus on an event that
occurred at a specific time and place. 175 A weaker case exists for
certification arising from nationally distributed products that give rise
to products liability claims by plaintiffs in multiple jurisdictions with
a variety of injuries occurring at difference times. 176 This analysis
suggests that the Simon II plaintiffs have a weak argument for
certification, with plaintiffs in a multitude of jurisdictions seeking
relief from the tobacco companies for a variety of injuries occurring at
different times.
4. The Nature of Punitive Damages
Finally, the nature of punitive damages itself undermines one
of the main arguments for the certification of punitive damage classes.
Proponents of certification suggest that certification under 23(b)(1)(B)
is necessary to prevent windfalls to early plaintiffs that will be
unavailable to later claimants. 177 In other words, certification is
needed because early adjudication may be dispositive of the interests
178
of other class members not a party to the suit.
The allocation of punitive damages among plaintiffs is
markedly different than the allocation of compensatory awards.
Compensatory damages are allocated on the notion that a particular
individual has been tortiously injured. 79 Accordingly, that person
should receive compensation for those injuries, regardless of injury
and subsequent compensation to other persons by the same
175. See id. at 44-50 (describing various mass accident cases); see also Hines, supra note 91,
at 908-10 (noting that cases involving mass accidents may "be of limited utility" to those
advocating for a mandatory punitive damages class for mass torts). Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Baker
(In re The Exxon Valdez), 229 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2000), is an example of a mass accident where
liability concerns are confined to a specific time and place. The district court certified a
mandatory punitive damages class after the grounding of an Exxon ship that caused an oil spill
affecting thousands of people in Alaska. Id. at 793, 797. The court noted that this case was
"uniquely" suited for mandatory class treatment because the case involved a mass accident and
not a nationwide products liability case. Id.; Hines, supra note 91, at 908.
176. Miller & Crump, supra note 169, at 45-46 (noting Dalkon Shield, a nationwide products
liability suit, which involved plaintiffs across jurisdictions claiming a variety of injuries from
"uterine perforations, infections, and hysterectomies to spontaneous abortion, fetal injuries and
pregnancy" provided an example of a weak case for certifying a mandatory punitive damages
class).
177. See Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 5, at 2006 (claiming that certification "brings
rationality and proportionality to the process and achieves more equitable and socially palatable
results than would... awarding windfalls" to early plaintiffs).
178. Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
179. Nagareda, supra note 3, at 948.
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defendant. 8 0 Punitive damages, however, serve a different purpose;
they are meant to punish defendants for extremely tortious
misdeeds.' 8 In this respect, individual plaintiffs have no entitlement
to punitive damage awards, in contradiction to the "to each, her own"
82
principle of compensatory awards.
Because punitive damages are not used to allocate
compensation to a particular plaintiff, but instead are an expression of
moral condemnation, each plaintiff can be viewed as an instrument for
visiting such punishment on defendants. 8 3
Awarding punitive
damages to early plaintiffs at the potential expense of later claimants
does not appear to violate the underlying principle of punitive
damages. 8 4 Accordingly, the "lottery like" nature of punitive damages
does not affect the true goal of punitive damages: the punishment and
85
deterrence of harmful conduct by the defendant.

IV. LOOKING FORWARD
While the certification of mandatory punitive damage classes
may not be reconcilable with current legal precedent, utility and
fairness suggest a need for the availability of such certification. The
final section of this Note will explore arguments in favor of mandatory
punitive damage classes, specifically focusing on issues of fairness to
plaintiffs and defendants, and on pragmatic concerns for how civil
litigation should evolve in the future. Finally, it will suggest that the
Supreme Court revisit the issue and make an exception from the
traditional mandate in Ortiz when applying Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to
punitive damage classes.

A.

Fairnessto Plaintiffs

While lottery-like windfalls of punitive damages to early
plaintiffs do not technically violate corrective justice, 8 6 there is a
180. Id.
181. Id. at 949; see also Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 5, at 2006-07 (punitive damages are
meant to "sting" defendants in order to perform their deterrent function).
182. See Nagareda, supra note 3, at 949 (suggesting that punitive damages are not an
entitlement of victims, but of society).
183. Id.; Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 5, at 2006-07.
184. See Nagareda, supra note 3, at 949 (discussing the "tendency... toward the frontloading of punitive damages on early plaintiffs").
185. Id.
186. See supra Part III.A.; see also Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment
Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583,
594 n.31 (2003) ("Because there is no entitlement to punitive damages, and because these
damages by definition exceed the amount necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff, allowing
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strong argument that such awards violate distributive justice.18 7 As
one commentator suggests, there is simply "something unfair about
awarding all of the punitive damages to a single victim." 18 8 This
argument takes on considerable force if the potential compensatory
damages are too low to create an adequate incentive for plaintiffs to
pursue claims.18 9 In other words, plaintiffs (and plaintiffs' lawyers)
are unlikely to file a "costly and complex lawsuit" if the compensatory
damages are minimal and punitive damages are capped by previous
plaintiffs who reached the substantive legal limits that may be
rendered against the defendant. 190 Allowing early plaintiffs to collect
all of the punitive damage pie may prevent later claimants from
collecting even their compensatory award.191
Another potential fairness issue stems from the opposite
situation, where the plaintiffs damages are enormous.
In this
scenario, if initial plaintiffs are able to bring punitive damage claims
representative of the "total harm" to all potential plaintiffs, there is a
risk that these initial awards will bankrupt the defendant. 192 Here
again, later claimants will not only be barred from seeking punitive
damages, but will be unable to receive compensatory awards because
the defendant's assets will have been consumed by prior punitive
damage awards. 93
An inability to certify mandatory punitive damage classes may
also lead to systemic bias against plaintiffs. 194 This problem arises
1 95
from the ability of defendants to create "de facto" certification.
Here, defendants faced with "classable claims"-those presenting
common issues of liability and damages--can prepare one defense to
cover all claims. 96 This strategy enables the defendant to litigate as if
the plaintiffs were contained in a certified class.1 97 Defendants are
only one plaintiff to recover all of the punitive damages does not inherently violate notions of
corrective justice.").
187. See id. at 594 n.20 (arguing that some scholars view distributive justice as seeking to
ensure a fair division of punitive damages awards among all victims, not simply those who race
to the courtroom door).
188. Id. at 594.
189. Id. at 595.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 5, at 2012-13 (describing how initial plaintiffs
may "deplete the defendant's assets so severely as to foreclose or diminish later claims").
193. Colby, supra note 186, at 595.

194. David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and PlaintiffsDon't,
37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 393-96 (2000).
195. Id. at 400.
196. Id. at 394.
197. Id.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:2:599

therefore able to "exploit economies of scale by investing once-and-forall in common questions and spreading the cost of that investment
across all claims."' 9 8 In doing so, defendants can avoid redundancy
costs that will drain resources away from more productive uses and
decrease the net benefits of litigation.199
Because different lawyers generally represent different
plaintiffs, no one lawyer will own a beneficial interest in all of the
claims that would enable the lawyer to invest once-and-for-all in
common questions of fact. "[N]o plaintiffs lawyer is able to spread
costs and reap the return gained by investing to maximize the
200
aggregate value from litigating the questions common to all claims."
Accordingly, plaintiffs are denied the efficiencies of class certification
that benefit defendants. This asymmetry allows defendants to make
significantly larger investments in the litigation, that plaintiffs,
21
through their individual lawyers, can never match.
The concerns surrounding defendants' ability to utilize de facto
class certification at the expense of plaintiffs is evident in the tobacco
litigation. 20 2
Tobacco defendants have been fairly successful at
defeating class certification by arguing that the plaintiffs' individual
characteristics, such as behavior and physiology, prevent such
certification. 203 This strategy traditionally has allowed defendants to
exploit economies of scale, investing in a common defense for all
claims, while exhausting individual plaintiffs with an "endless array
20 4
of pretrial delays and discovery mechanizations."
The concern for fairness to plaintiffs is only one of the
arguments for certifying mandatory punitive damage classes.
Concern for defendants and for the efficiency of the litigation process
counsel in favor of mandatory punitive damage certification.
B. Benefits to Defendants
While it is true that the tobacco defendants are fighting to
prevent punitive damage class certification, 20 5 opposition from
198. Id. at 397.
199. Id.
200. Id. 400-01.
201. Id. at 401.
202. Cabraser, supra note 2, at 1000.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1001.
205. Purely speculating, tobacco defendants likely viewed their liability after class
certification as higher than it would be through individual plaintiffs suits. This outcome may
have been a result of the defendants' early luck in quashing plaintiffs' suits through pre-trial
delays, etc. See Cabraser, supra note 2, at 1001 (discussing the tobacco defendants' use of
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defendants will not always be the case. In the Exxon Valdez litigation,
it was the defendant, Exxon Corporation, who sought certification on a
limited generosity theory. 206 In such a situation, the inability to
certify and decide punitive damages for the entire class will leave
defendants open to excessive punishment from multiple plaintiffs
seeking punitive damages.
This concern is not unfounded. When plaintiffs bring claims
for punitive damages against a defendant, the damages awarded to
them are for harm allegedly caused to an entire mass of people. 20 7
While punitive damages are considered quasi-criminal in nature, 208
they do not have the procedural protection against double jeopardy
that is available in the criminal context. 20 9 As such, there is nothing
to prevent successive punishment resulting from later plaintiffs who
seek "total harm" punitive damages for themselves. 210 In effect, this
over-punishes defendants, forcing them, through fragmented
litigation, to pay repeatedly for the total harm caused to all plaintiffs.
Notably, the constitutional limit on punitive damages that can
be rendered against a defendant does not serve as a successful barrier
to multiple, successive "total harm" punitive damage awards against
defendants. As Professor Richard Nagareda notes, "[n]otwithstanding
decades of mass tort litigation, the harsh fact remains that not a
single defendant has succeeded in constraining demands for punitive
damages based on the invocation of the purported constitutional
bound."211 In this regard, defendants' interest in fairness also
suggests a need for mandatory punitive damage certification in mass
torts.

strategies to delay litigation). Certifying the plaintiffs' class also would allow plaintiffs to exploit
economies of scale, bringing them in economic parity with the tobacco defendants-something
the defendants likely were trying to avoid. See Rosenberg, supra note 194, at 397-403 (describing
how aggregating mass tort claims allows plaintiffs to exploit economies of scale). This economy
suggests the need for certification of such classes to prevent unfairness to plaintiffs.
206. Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Baker (In re The Exxon Valdez), 229 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2000)
(detailing procedural history of Exxon Valdez litigation).
207. Colby, supra note 186, at 596 (noting that the system of awarding punitive damages as
it stands may be unfair to defendants in that it awards punitive damages for the "harm allegedly
caused to an entire mass of people in a lawsuit brought by only one person").
208. Nagareda, supra note 3, at 948 (describing punitive damages as quasi-criminal damages
that "operate as 'private fines' intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing"
(citations omitted)).
209. Colby, supra note 186, at 597 (noting that res judicata plays no role when different
plaintiffs are seeking the same damages).
210. Id.
211. Nagareda, supranote 3, at 958.
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C. Efficiency Concerns for Mass Tort Litigation
In evaluating the certification of mandatory punitive damage
classes, it is important to consider the effect certification will have on
civil litigation in the future. With the influx of products that are mass
advertised, produced, and distributed, mass tort litigation will
continue to evolve. The question now is how the civil system should
handle such cases in the future.
As it stands, defendants have little incentive to resolve pending
litigation quickly and efficiently because of plaintiffs' inability to
achieve certification under Ortiz and State Farm.212 Defendants who
have no assurance about potential future punitive damage liability
will be more apt to "bide their time, trying or settling cases only as
2 13
actual trial dates approach on court dockets across the country."
Defendants will only consider an attempt at a "comprehensive
resolution" of pending litigation if it offers them peace, in some form,
from punitive damage awards. 21 4 In other words, defendants' inability
to assure peace on the punitive damage front is creating "a roadblock"
21 5
for the resolution of mass tort litigation.
If certification of mandatory, non-opt out punitive damage
classes becomes a possibility, defendants could achieve certainty on
the punitive damage front. This certainty would allow defendants to
define an outer boundary on punitive damage liability, creating an
increased incentive to resolve remaining issues in the litigation
efficiently. In this regard, the comprehensive resolution of plaintiffs'
compensatory claims will be more attractive, motivating defendants to
offer settlement in appropriate cases and making them less likely to
216
barrage plaintiffs with an array of pre-trial motions and delays.
The certification of mandatory punitive damage classes therefore
allows for a civil litigation process that gives assurance to defendants
on issues of liability and encourages efficient resolution of mass tort
claims.
D. Looking Forward-Decidingthe Issue of Mandatory Certification
While Ortiz did not address explicitly the issue of certification
of limited generosity funds under 23(b)(1)(B), that decision clearly will
212. Id. at 952.
213. Id.
214. Id. (noting that "peace" does not mean "paying little or nothing;" instead, it means only
a discernable outer boundary on liability for punitive damages).
215. Id.
216. See id. (arguing that the idea of a mandatory class action will result in a rethinking of
class action in tort litigation).
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have far-reaching implications for plaintiffs' ability to achieve
217 It
certification of such classes in a majority of mass tort cases.
seems that the easiest way to facilitate a needed change in the law
would be for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on this issue. To
achieve fairness and efficiency in mass tort litigation in the future, the
Supreme Court should rethink Ortiz's limitations on certification
under 23(b)(1)(B). 218
By making an exception to the traditional
application of the rule for mandatory punitive damage classes, courts
will be able to grant certification on a limited fund theory-even when
the fund is only theoretically limited by the legal limits on punitive
damage liability.
V. CONCLUSION
Today, with the wealth of products that are mass produced,
marketed and consumed, complex issues in mass tort litigation have
become increasingly salient.
While some view State Farm as
embracing the concept of mandatory punitive damage certification
under a limited generosity theory, lower courts remain constrained by
the traditional application of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandated in Ortiz and
by the limitations in State Farm itself.
Fairness to both plaintiffs and defendants, combined with the
desire for efficiency in the resolution of mass tort cases, suggests a
need for change. Unconstrained by explicit language in Ortiz that
prohibits certification of mandatory punitive damage classes, the
Supreme Court is in a position to carve out an exception from the
traditional application of 23(b)(1)(B) for punitive damage classes,
allowing certification to accommodate the interests of defendants and
plaintiffs alike.
Aileen L. Nagy

*

217. See supra Part II.B.
218. It should be noted that granting certiorari on the issue of limitations in Ortiz will still
leave multi-state mass tort cases vulnerable under choice of law issues. Although outside the
scope of this Note, the Supreme Court could resolve this additional problem by granting
certiorari in a case like Simon II. The Court then could not only expand the holding of Ortiz in
order to allow mandatory punitive damages classes, but also clarify the holding of Shutts to allow
certification of non-opt-out punitive damages classes under one state's law or, alternatively, to
permit sub-classification by state. See Steinman, supra note 86 (discussing the issue of subclassification of mass tort claims).
' Many thanks to Professor Richard Nagareda for his considerable help in developing this
topic and for his valuable advice, information and insightful discussions with me. I am also
grateful to the members of the Vanderbilt Law Review who helped in the editing of this Note.

